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Abstract–Urban social segregation modeling from the bottom 
up attempts at understanding the processes which take place 
when residents look for a new home. This micro-scale 
perspective thus requires implementing actual individual 
agents instead of socially unified communities with similar or 
identical behavior. Complementary, meso- and macro-scale 
determinants such as housing markets, estate agencies, urban 
planning institutions, and societal life-style preferences must be 
incorporated in order to comprehensively and adequately 
simulate residential mobility. The paper presents an attempt to 
simulate urban socio-spatial segregation for the city of 
Salzburg, Austria, by consistently taking the individual 
household scale into account. We first apply the beneficial 
features of a Schelling-style simulation model by also taking 
macro-social regularities into account. This is followed by a 
description of an adapted segregation model that includes the 
mentioned requirements. The paper concludes with an 
extensive presentation and discussion of the model results 
achieved so far. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of households in urban space, its 
underlying mechanisms, processes and spatiotemporal 
structures, is a complex phenomenon (see, for instance, [1], 
[2] as references for complexity science). The social and 
spatial patterns which arise and – subtly and dynamically – 
change over time, such as segregation, residential up- and 
down-grading, gentrification, places of inclusion and 
exclusion, are significantly influenced and determined by 
numerous rules, markets, political attitudes, and behaviors of 
different stakeholders. Attempts to model issues of 
households’ location-allocation patterns and of simulating 
their processes have to take the three crucial domains of 
‘scales’, ‘entities’, and ‘interactions’ explicitly into 
consideration to adequately analyze and evaluate how social 
and spatial forces are mutually linked. 
The following paper presents an attempt at modeling and 
simulating processes of urban socio-spatial segregation by 
primarily focusing on the local scale of households, their 
interactions and decision-making when reflecting on the 
socio-spatial neighborhood setting compared with 
preferences and/or dissatisfactions. In so doing, the 
theoretical domain of the model’s purpose is to highlight the 
individual acting conditions embedded into the context of  
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intra-urban moves. An actor-centered modeling perspective 
appears to be important, because it makes the scope and 
constraints from the bottom up explicit and visible. This 
perspective, however, ought to be complemented by macro 
determinants, such as housing markets, the capitalization of 
these markets, Estate Agencies, urban planning strategies, as 
well as social norms and cultural attitudes towards life-style 
and neighborhood building, which affect individual 
decisions in a top-down manner. Putting emphasis on intra-
urban moves is justified since they make up the majority of 
all residential mobility; for European cities, for instance, 
they vary between approx. 20 movers per 1,000 inhabitants in 
Irish cities and up to 121 in Finnish cities, per year [3, p. 
252] (comparative data is from 1980). This remarkable range 
can be used as one indicator for the mutual relationship 
between the local-individual and global-social scale.     
The methodological domain of the model’s purpose is to 
comprehensively model residential agents as individual units. 
The Schelling-style segregation model serves thereby as a 
starting point and benchmark. One of the great benefits of 
this model type lies in its emphasis on emerging spatial 
patterns at the macro level which cannot be thoroughly 
explained by investigating the motives and interaction 
patterns at the micro level. The aim of this paper is to alter 
some of the agents’ premises and neighborhood rules of 
evaluation and movement in order to strictly individualize the 
defined entity of households. The problem of many 
Schelling-style models is that they do not consistently 
account for the individual but refer only to collective acting. 
From the initialization of the model up to the agents’ 
evaluation and decision to move, a homogenized rule setting 
procedure has been implemented. 
In the remainder we first take a brief look at some of the 
macro-social regularities which determine the agents’ power 
to act, followed by a discussion about the need to modify 
Schelling-style segregation models. An individualized model 
approach is then presented, describing first the agents’ 
characteristics and then illustrating the effects by presenting 
some of the relevant model’s results.  
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II. THE MACRO SCALE OF SEGREGATION 
The “Nature of Cities”, published by Harris and Ullman in 
1945, has changed economically, socially, politically, 
culturally, and geographically in structure, shape, meaning 
and function. With respect to the function of housing in 
general and the different socio-spatial patterns of segregation 
in particular several theoretical approaches have been 
developed putting the macro scale forces to the fore. One 
early but, to date, influential approach to investigate 
gentrification as a specific kind of segregation (which we are 
interested in here) is the rent gap theory [4], [5]. The core 
concern of this theory is a profit-driven economic 
explanation of the processes of social, cultural, and 
architectural upgrading accompanied by social 
homogenization of gentrified neighborhoods and the 
displacement of less affluent households. The emergence of a 
rent gap in city areas has been linked with suburbanization of 
urban agglomerations. “Inner-city decline and suburban 
expansion has therefore led to a rent gap – a disparity 
between the potential rents that could be commanded by 
inner-city properties and the actual rents they are 
commanding”. [3, p. 145] Rent-gap-driven socio-spatial 
revaluation remains an important aspect in urban 
redevelopment, mainly as a consequence of the contemporary 
financial and economic crises. This in turn means that 
classical models, such as the Chicago model of urban 
structure are “[…] now largely redundant”. [6, p. 128] On the 
other hand, an exclusive rent-gap perspective “[…] leaves 
little room for human agency or consumer preferences. Thus, 
by itself, the rent-gap theory cannot explain which cities, and 
which areas within cities, are most likely to be regenerated”. 
[3, p. 146] 
A different but closely related macro-scale approach, 
highlighting the processes of residential mobility and 
neighborhood change, is the concept of invasion-succession-
cycles [7]. It describes the invasion of low-income 
households, referred to as pioneers (e.g. students, artists, 
alternative life-style people), into obsolescent city areas. 
During this phase a cultural revaluation, by establishing new 
and alternative stores (e.g., ethnic food restaurants) and 
services (e.g., galleries), and a modest architectural 
revaluation, the so called incumbent upgrading, takes place. 
A second cycle is being initiated by the invasion of 
gentrifiers who prefer the cultural atmosphere but dislike the 
built environment. Due to large-scale and costly architectural 
revaluation, often realized by large property development 
companies, housing becomes significantly more expensive, 
resulting in extensive displacement of less affluent 
households, including the pioneers of the first phase. 
Although this theory represents a socio-spatial generalization 
of city development which is often triggered by urban 
planning strategies and political desires of urban uniqueness 
under conditions of global competitiveness, it is 
simultaneously understood as a bottom-up approach to 
explaining individual preferences. It is, however, not a strict 
and pervasive individual perspective, but one that takes into 
account communities (milieus, life-styles) as more or less 
homogenous entities into [8, p. 66]. 
A further determinant influencing individual decision-
making and agency is given with institutional stakeholders. 
[9]-[10], among others, claims an integrative approach for a 
theory of segregation by including a theory of social 
inequality, a theory of spatial inequality, and a theory of 
allocation of living space and city districts to households and 
social aggregates. Apart from builders, developers, mortgage 
lenders, and government agencies it is the Estate Agents who 
do play a crucial role within the network of mediators 
between sellers and buyers or landlords and tenants. 
Residential property management, insurance, data collection 
and analysis, and financing are only a few of the tasks they 
undertake and contribute to housing market mechanisms. 
“They are not simply passive brokers in these transactions, 
however; they influence the social production of the built 
environment in several ways. In addition to the bias 
introduced in their role as mediators of information, some 
estate agents introduce a deliberate bias by steering 
households into, or away from, a specific neighborhood in 
order to maintain what they regard as optimal market 
conditions. […] Thus the safest response for realtors is to 
keep like with like and to deter persons from moving to areas 
occupied by persons ‘unlike’ themselves”. [3, p. 143] 
Though real estate agents complexify segregation processes 
one should keep in mind that simplified decentralized 
bilateral trading mechanisms, too, can exhibit remarkable 
complexity at the individual level, as is shown by [11].  
There are undoubtedly several more approaches which deal 
with macro implications of segregation. One may think of the 
theory of fragmenting development which links global trends 
of economic and political developments to locally 
fragmented but homogenous processes of residential 
structuring [12]; other determinants are social housing 
policies, the public housing sector, or the creation of large 
housing complexes that give rise to influences on the 
individual scale of households. Though all these criteria are 
relevant to understanding segregation in a comprehensive 
way, it is usually difficult to represent them adequately. 
Apart from data availability at fine resolution and the 
necessity to suitably translate them into procedural code, it is 
sometimes hard to connect the (potential) knowledge to a 
valid synoptic unity (e.g., how do you weigh all the 
information properly?). The following model incorporates 
the above mentioned determinants in a fuzzy and 
approximate way by using rent price as a cumulative 
indicator which has been disaggregated by statistical 
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techniques. This appears to be justified by the model’s 
purpose, because it has its thematic priority in a 
comprehensive individualization of agents’ agency. 
III. WITH SCHELLING BEYOND SCHELLING: 
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF AGENTS  
Urban segregation appears to be an amalgamation of 
smaller-scale intra-urban moves and larger-scale in- and out-
migration. [3] refers to empirical results of intra-urban 
mobility which allow for some generalization in the search 
for regularities of social homogenization at the neighborhood 
scale. We refer to these regularities as a coarse framing of 
agents’ social and spatial evaluation and decision-making 
behavior, in addition to the macro-social influential forces 
mentioned above. “The most significant regularities in intra-
urban movement patterns […] relate to the relative 
socioeconomic status of origin and destination areas. The 
vast majority of moves […] take place within census tracts of 
similar socioeconomic characteristics”. [3, p. 254] This result 
correlates closely with the distance of moves which have 
been found to be comparatively short, however, varying by 
income, tenure, ethnic belonging and suchlike. Another 
determinant is the distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary moves, which are not recognized as a sharp 
dichotomy in the following model (and voluntary moves are 
in themselves different, which causes ongoing discourses on 
the evaluation of ‘voluntary’ moves; see, e.g., [13, p. 36].  
The search for a new home is commonly biased, too. 
Criteria such as living-space, tenure, dwelling preferences, 
built environment, and social neighborhood all need to be 
considered. In addition, the search space is strongly 
correlated with local knowledge about urban districts, 
influenced by spatial activity patterns and information 
sources (e.g., media, friends). “It follows that different 
subgroups of households, with distinctive activity spaces and 
mental maps, will tend to exhibit an equally distinctive 
spatial bias in their search behaviour”. (ibid., p. 262) For the 
following model it is assumed that agents are flexible in their 
search space, being able to get information about living costs 
(the spatial rent domain) and the social status of neighbors 
(the social attitude domain) [14, p. 101]. 
Against this background the benefit of Schelling-style 
segregation models lies in its explicit focus on local 
circumstances as reasons for processes of socio-spatial 
homogenization. The model’s purpose is directed towards the 
micro-macro link of individual agency [15], [16, p. 83]. The 
phenomenon that, if agents act according to their subjective 
aspirations of residing in close proximity to other agents 
with equal social characteristics, a global pattern arises 
which cannot be derived from these aspirations 
straightforwardly, is one of the most important results of 
Schelling’s model approach. The detection of emerging 
segregation to a much stronger extent than individually 
anticipated and intended is, on the other hand, a result of a 
standardization of the individual agent. 
For the development of a conceptual segregation model the 
difficulty is to combine methodologically true individual 
entities with socially similar characteristics and behavior. 
This challenge is framed by complex empirical knowledge. 
Just to give an example about the intentionality of 
contributing to socially homogenous neighborhoods: [17, p. 
89], by highlighting a continuum of nearness and distance as 
a determinant for social relations, argues: “Therefore, for 
extensive co-residing as in modern cities, individuals have 
also developed subtle, complex and sometimes partially 
unconscious and unintended ways of dissociating from and 
discriminating against others”. Contrary to this 
‘unconscious’ and ‘unintended’ behavior effect, [18, p. 48] 
stresses an explicit desire “[…] for coherence, for structured 
exclusion and internal sameness […]”, which in turn seems 
to be in contradiction with contemporary aims of living in 
vivid mutual supportive communities: “Innate to the process 
of forming a coherent image of community is the desire to 
avoid actual participation. Feeling common bonds without 
common experience occurs in the first place because men are 
afraid of participation, afraid of the dangers and the 
challenges of it, afraid of its pain”. [18, p. 42] Both facets 
can be observed empirically, the latter, for instance, in gated 
communities and (partly) gentrified neighborhoods, while the 
former is more common in organically grown, multi-cultural 
urban neighborhoods. 
A reliable conflation of individual agency (subjective 
opportunities for freedom with respect to aspirations, 
preferences, but also constraints) and social influences 
(power relations, cultural bias, or recognition of capabilities) 
in segregation modeling is justified by empirical experience 
and progressive debates on modifications and alterations of 
Schelling-like models [19]-[23]; for a review of these studies 
see [16, p. 83-87], [17, p. 88-97]. [17, p. 96] draws the 
conclusion “[…] that if individual preferences and perceived 
differences between groups refer just to one characteristic, 
such as ethnicity, religion or political position, and decision 
is binary, segregation is unavoidable and social integration is 
impossible”. From a modeling perspective the unrealistic 
determination is due to the univariate reference and the 
binary decision scheme. Moreover, relaxing the causal link 
between the decision-threshold of (dis-)satisfaction and 
corresponding action should surmount the seeming 
inevitability of segregation. 
Furthermore, the individual-community link complexifies 
the discussion about segregation when taking majority-
minority relationships into consideration. In this case 
processes of inclusion and social cohesion can conflate with 
displacement, and political claims of integration and 
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neighborhood diversity converge or diverge scale-
dependently by quite similar transformations. From a model 
perspective it is very hard (or even impossible) to reasonably 
disentangle the bundle of interwoven processes and relations. 
“The language of ‘preference’ and ‘tolerance’ surrounding 
the Schelling model can give the appearance that such claims 
are being made. It is important to keep in mind that we could 
just as easily interpret the movement of minority households 
into friendly neighborhoods as arising from an inability to 
access neighborhoods with a high presence of the majority, a 
reading that would make the driving mechanism not 
preference but discrimination. Such debates are not about the 
model’s outcomes but about its interpretation and what can 
be inferred from it”. [16, p. 85]  
To sum up: the consequent disaggregation of agents’ 
characteristics and behavior towards the individual level is an 
attempt to avoid homogenous community building that 
derives deterministically from an a priori standardized 
setting of attributes which leaves agents indistinguishable. 
The inherent sameness of agents at the group level in the 
original model contains segregation within itself as a 
predictable outcome to some degree. Truly distinguishable 
agents do recognize social conditions, nonetheless, but they 
do it differently. We put the emphasis on similar agents 
acting similarly with regard to similar decision-making. 
IV. THE SEGREGATION MODEL 
The current version of the segregation model is a 
conceptual simulation model which serves predominantly as 
an instance to verify the model’s purpose. It has been built to 
simulate intra-urban residential mobility in the city of 
Salzburg, Austria, by highlighting emerging patterns of 
socio-spatial cohesion. A quantity of census data from 2001 
has been used to carry out a factor analysis followed by a 
cluster analysis. The data is applied to initialize spatial raster 
cell characteristics on an approximate empirical basis. The 
model will be further developed as soon as census data from 
2011 are available (which is expected in July 2014). It is 
intended then to transform raster cell resolution to a 250 by 
250 meter scale in accordance with the officially available 
data provided by the Austrian Statistics Authority [24]. A 
validation of segregation processes over the period of one 
decade will then be possible. 
A. Agents’ Properties 
The entire agent population is subdivided into four 
different subgroups, representing cluster characteristics 
which have been derived from a factor analysis with 14 
socio-demographic variables (e.g., education, age cohorts, 
religion, household size, nationality). Clusters represent 
demographic characteristics of the city of Salzburg at district 
level and have been disaggregated randomly at cell level. 
The realization of creating individual agents refers to 
agents’ characteristics and decisions as well as executed 
actions. With respect to characteristics, ‘income’ is used as a 
prototypical randomized variable using a normal distribution 
function with a small standard deviation to individualize an 
agent’s economic situation. In addition to the variation of 
income within the four subgroups a variation between them 
has been applied. This is to vary the economic wealth of 
agents at the collective scale, representing social status. 
Due to the normal distribution of income values there is no 
sharp distinction between agents as economically defined 
entities. In so doing, we included a second variable, 
‘attitude’, which represents agents’ social preferences (or 
disaffirmations) in a qualitatively generalized way; an agent’s 
‘attitude’ is represented by color. This is according to the 
idea mentioned above. The fluent transition of economic 
property (income) correlates with a clear distinction of the 
social characteristic (attitude) and allows for a reasonable 
diversity of agents; for instance, two red agents share the 
same attitude but differ in income, and a red and blue agent 
may have similar income, but differ in their attitudes.  
The reference variable for every agent to derive its initial 
income is given with the ‘rent’ value of the cell (patch) in 
which an agent is situated initially. Thus, a valid relationship 
of agent-location interaction is achieved. 
The evaluation procedure of an agent’s neighborhood 
embraces the affordability of the current location and the 
(dis-)satisfaction with its neighborhood. Whilst in the first 
case agents must move if their income is less than the costs 
for housing, in the latter they are equipped with some 
flexibility when gauging neighbors’ characteristics of income 
and attitude. The common approach in agent-based 
segregation modeling is a single unified threshold value 
which will be applied to all agents. In contrast to this 
approach we, first, use two thresholds (for income and 
attitude, separately) and, secondly, vary the values of income 
by applying a range of values around the mean income (the 
qualitative indicator of ‘attitude’ remains as a binary 
variable). The income threshold which, as mentioned earlier, 
represents the socio-economic status of an agent 
approximately, is then transformed by a normal distribution 
function in order to individualize the decision-making 
process for residential moves. 
In addition, and different from traditional segregation 
modeling, we have inserted two more modifications. First, 
not all agents move even if they fulfill the condition of being 
dissatisfied. The reason for this can be justified with 
empirical observations: residential relocation is a complex 
fact involving lots of criteria which must be pondered 
deliberately and diligently (which is represented here quite 
inaccurate by just two dimensions). The desire of retaining 
social ties developed over a long period or the established 
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familiarity of every-day activities may represent reasons 
which imply some inertial behavior though dissatisfaction is 
a significant counter force [3, p. 253]. Furthermore, even if 
one feels dissatisfied with one’s current social and spatial 
neighborhood situation, relocation is not the one and only 
obligatory response to it. One may think of political activism 
or community engagement in order to improve local social 
well-being.  
Secondly, and contrary to the first modification, agents 
may wish to move even though they might be satisfied with 
their current neighborhood. Reasons for such a decision 
might be the inheritance of a house or apartment, change of 
work place, family situation, life-style changes, or simply the 
search for the perfect home.  
Agents who are economically not able to find an affordable 
dwelling in the city of Salzburg within a certain period of 
time are forced to move to the suburban region. In turn, 
agents with sufficient income can either return to the city or 
immigrate for the first time. With this procedure we have 
included migration in addition to intra-urban mobility. 
B. Spatial Entities’ Properties 
Spatial entities (patches) represent housing costs as scaled 
values derived from cluster data. The scaling of values is 
based initially on a normal distribution and then adapted to 
the cluster characteristics. The data used represent a coarse 
approximation of the socio-demographic situation at census 
district level and is disaggregated statistically, but verified as 
a proven approximation by experts from city authorities. 
C. General Model Issues 
The model has been implemented in NetLogo 5.0.4 [25] 
and will be made public at the author’s homepage 
(http://www.socialgeography.at) and OpenABM 
(http://www.openabm.org). The parameters ‘income’ of 
agents and ‘housing costs’ of spatial entities increase 
marginally per time step, i.e. there is an interaction pattern 
not only among agents, but also between them (the social 
domain) and the cells (the spatial domain). The latter type of 
interaction is currently implemented in an abstract way, 
because only a global trend of housing costs is included due 
to data availability restrictions. There is, however, no local 
modification of this global trend at the moment. One may 
think, for instance, of a higher/lower dynamic in areas of 
high/low status neighborhoods. What has been implemented, 
however, is an accidental above-average increase and 
decrease, respectively, of housing costs, whereby 5% of all 
patches are then affected by an increase and 3% by a 
decrease. The extent can be altered interactively, for the 
subsequent model results the increase is set to 20% and the 
decrease to 10%. 
V. SELECTED MODEL RESULTS  
The resolution of the city is set to approx. 15,000 spatial 
entities inhabited by 150,000 citizens. A number of 6,000 
agents is selected as potential intra-urban movers which is a 
conservative estimation of 4% of the total population. 
Initially, agents of all four subgroups are randomly 
distributed over the urban space, according to the price per 
patch, i.e., initially, every agent can afford the dwelling 
she/he is living in. Census districts are colored according to 
the cluster they belong to, representing housing costs which 
vary from cheap to expensive in the following sequence: 
brown-orange-blue-pink-green-yellow. 
 The standard model has the following settings: the 
proportion of each subgroup is the same (25%), the 
preferences of similarity for each group is 25% for ‘income 
similarity’ and 20% for ‘attitude similarity’. Income and 
housing price growth rates are set equal to 0.5% per time 
step. 70% of actually dissatisfied agents actually move, but 
also 5% of actually satisfied agents do so. Two remarkable 
results are noteworthy: (1) Compared with a Schelling-type 
model, segregation is no longer a common phenomenon, 
being distributed evenly over the urban space (see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 spatial representation of segregation with the 
standard simulation model 
 
Instead, segregation is concentrated in affordable districts 
(colored brown and orange), and its spatial manifestation is 
given at a small-scale level. In high-price districts (green and 
yellow) socio-spatial community building of similar agents is 
much harder to achieve, even for the most affluent (red 
agents). (2) Segregation takes place, notwithstanding. 
Ultimately different degrees of neighborhood evaluation, of 
decision-making processes and agents’ as well as patches’ 
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
  
 
 
characteristics do not avoid clustering of similar agents. The 
exceptional fact is the declining degree of segregation, most 
obvious for the least affluent (blue agents) and only very 
limited for the most affluent. As an attempt to interpret one 
might be tempted here to draw a distinction between 
involuntary moves, caused by displacement, and higher 
opportunities for freedom with respect to affordability, 
income and attitude preferences. For the current model there 
is only a qualitative statement of experts’ empirical 
experiences, verifying the segregation clusters in the north of 
Salzburg, but of less scope in the eastern district. Other 
interesting results refer to the extent of outmigration to the 
suburban region, which significantly depends on the agent’s 
income and the city’s housing cost situation, and which is 
most problematic for the least affluent subgroup (see Fig. 2). 
Sudden dramatic rises of rents do affect all tenants in more 
or less the same way (Fig. 3).   
 
Fig. 2 number of agents expelled from the city 
 (standard model) 
 
 
Fig. 3 proportions of agents dissatisfied and sudden 
increases of rent prices (standard model) 
 
The standard segregation simulation model is provided 
with eleven parameters to modify and alter the behavior space 
of agents according to the theoretical requirements 
mentioned above. The behavior space, therefore, offers a 
wide range of opportunities for if-then-analyses and scenario 
building. In what follows four model variations which appear 
to be relevant for the (potential) emergence of segregation 
will be discussed briefly. 
The first modification refers to the variation of the 
(individualized) thresholds of ‘income’ and ‘attitude’. One 
hypothesis here is that the more affluent subgroups (red and 
green agents) appreciate higher degrees of income-similarity 
while the less affluent prefer higher degrees of attitude-
similarity. Thus, income-similarity of red and green agents is 
set to 40%, and attitude-similarity to 15%. Yellow and blue 
agents’ preferences are set to 25% for income-similarity and 
45% for attitude-similarity. As Fig. 4 illustrates (with four 
sudden significant leaps of housing costs), a differentiation 
in the quality of preferences leads to two different levels of 
realized homogenous neighborhoods of similar agents. The 
trajectories of either two subgroups remain, however, 
relatively similar. It turns out that the emergence of 
neighborhoods with higher aspirations of income-similarity 
is less difficult to achieve than is the case for attitude-
similarity. This can be explained with the continuous 
variance of the income variable which makes the 
arrangements of local co-residing much easier than for the 
dichotomous attitude variable, even in the case of 
individualized agents.  
 
Fig. 4 proportions of agents dissatisfied and sudden 
increase of rent prices (change-of-preference model) 
Segregation patterns are in part similar to the standard 
model – higher proportions of small-scale segregation have 
been evolved in the cheaper districts –, but are also different 
from that model, because red and green agents have now been 
more successful in the creation of homogenous 
neighborhoods. Finally, the effect of the cost jumps is 
different for the four subgroups (see Fig. 5); while for the 
least affluent agent population (blue) displacement is a 
cumulative force from the very beginning of the simulation, it 
is of only marginal relevance for the more and most affluent 
during the first half of simulation time and remains less 
influential in the second half. 
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The parameters that determine the proportion of unhappy 
agents who actually move and happy agents who move 
notwithstanding, are relatively insensitive. For the first case 
we varied the proportion between 60% and 90% without 
significant changes in the model output. The latter has been 
varied between 3% and 10%, again without significant 
changes. These results hold true if the preferences for 
income-similarity and/or attitude-similarity are being varied 
(between 20% and 40% for both kinds across agents’ 
subgroups). 
 
Fig. 5 number of agents expelled from the city  
(change-of-preference model) 
 
 A third variation of the standard simulation model 
considers the independent variables of ‘increase of income’ 
and ‘increase of housing costs’ as influential for 
neighborhood composition. Income-similarity and attitude-
similarity is set to 35% for every subgroup. If income 
development is substantially higher than the development of 
housing costs (the subsequent model used an earnings 
growth of 0.7% per time step and a growth of housing costs 
of 0.3% per time step) then the more or less expected result 
is that all subgroups are able to live in the city. The 
differences between groups are marginal and even sudden 
leaps of rising prices do not affect agents’ residential 
behavior significantly (Fig. 6).  
In fact, the percentage of dissatisfied agents is decreasing 
slightly. Furthermore, even small clusters of homogenous 
neighborhoods of medium- and high-income households in 
more expensive districts have evolved. The situation changes 
with a reverse relationship, but less significant than 
expected. Remarkably, the four subgroups do not differ in 
their capability to create homogenous neighborhoods (Fig. 
7). Sudden changes of housing costs do, however, influence 
this capability explicitly; in the simulation illustrated in Fig. 
7 the percentage of unhappy agents increases from approx. 
37% before up to 63% after the price jump. 
Fig. 6 proportions of agents dissatisfied and sudden increase 
of rent prices (change-of-income-cost relationship model), 
with 0.3% / 0.7% cost-income-rise relationship 
 
Fig. 7 proportions of agents dissatisfied and sudden increase 
of rent prices (change-of-income-cost relationship model), 
with 0.7% / 0.3% cost-income-rise relationship 
  
The last variation takes the range of action of minorities 
into account. A first modification refers to the situation of 
having one minority in the city, starting with the least 
affluent subgroup (blue agents). They represent 10% of the 
urban population while the other three subgroups make 30% 
each. The poor minority wishes to live in a neighborhood of 
at least 50% of agents sharing a similar attitude; its 
aspiration towards income-similarity is comparatively low 
(20%). The remaining subgroups all have a relationship of 
35% income-similarity and attitude-similarity, respectively. 
 Surprisingly, the poor minority does not have completely 
different troubles in dealing with its preferences of co-
residing (Fig. 8) though there are fewer opportunities 
because of the small size of this group. The size of the group 
might be a suitable explanation for this result since 
majorities – primarily the socially adjacent group of yellow 
agents with slightly higher income and less restrictive 
preferences – are more powerful competitors in the housing 
market. Rent gaps and public housing allocation policy, as 
mentioned above, may contribute to amplify or mitigate this 
competitive change in socio-spatial distribution. Fig. 9 
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confirms this thesis in part: the competition among the three 
relative majorities outperforms the competition between them 
with the minority. 
 
 
Fig. 8 proportions of agents dissatisfied  
(poor-minority model) 
 
 
Fig. 9 number of agents expelled from the city  
(poor-minority model) 
 
If the most affluent subgroup in the city is in a minority 
situation – and their aspirations are more directed towards 
income-similarity (50%) and less towards attitude-similarity 
(20%) – then the underlying principle does change visibly: 
the affluent agents do much more to achieve their 
preferences, and the percentage of unhappy fellows is 
significantly larger than it was for the poor agents (Fig. 10). 
Simultaneously, the least affluent agent group exhibits a 
contradictory fact: on the one hand it is much easier for them 
to segregate themselves in the affordable districts; on the 
other hand the number of expelled agents is much higher 
than it is for the other three groups (Fig. 11). One 
explanation might again lie in greater competition between 
socially and economically similar communities of the same 
population size. 
 
 
Fig. 10 proportions of agents dissatisfied 
(rich-minority model) 
 
 
 
Fig. 11 number of agents expelled from the city  
(rich-minority model) 
 
 
The second modification of majority-minority relationship 
investigates the constellation of two minorities. In the first 
scenario the most and least affluent agent groups find 
themselves in a minority position. While the richest agents 
prefer income-similarity (50% compared with 20% attitude-
similarity) the poorest like it the other way round. In 
addition, housing costs growth is higher than income growth. 
Now, both minorities have significantly greater difficulties in 
segregating themselves (Fig. 12). They live in some kind of 
diaspora while the two middle-class majority populations are 
able to create small-scale but widespread homogenous 
neighborhoods. They, however, struggle most against 
displacement. 
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Fig. 12 proportions of agents dissatisfied  
(two-minorities’ model) 
 
On the assumption that social polarization took place in 
the city, with high proportions of most and least affluent 
agent groups (80%), and a strong minority of middle-classes 
(20%) which prefer attitude-similarity to a higher degree 
(50% compared with 20% of income-similarity) then, again, 
it becomes obvious that displacement of the poor to the 
affordable districts (and to the suburban region) does play a 
crucial role in intra-urban residential mobility (Fig. 13). On 
the other hand, no large-scale gentrification of the richest 
agents in the most expensive districts takes place. This 
modeling outcome is contrary to the empirical reality and 
thus confirms the necessity to take macro social conditions 
more seriously into account (thus, the failure of the model 
here is coherent and logical). 
 
 
Fig. 13 spatial representation of segregation with the 
two minorities’ simulation model 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical aim of the paper was to develop a segregation 
simulation model which implements a coherent 
individualization of agents’ characteristics and behavioral 
settings. The model’s purpose is to highlight the bottom-up 
processes which may help to understand better the emerging 
patterns of urban socio-spatial homogenization. In so doing, 
the social macro determinants are included as 
complementary, but implicit, forces of this complex 
phenomenon. They should be implemented in a more explicit 
manner in a forthcoming version of this model. The 
methodological aim, thus, was to verify the current 
conceptual simulation model. With the availability of the 
latest data around July 2014 this next step will be executed. 
 The observation of [14, p. 123], “despite the elegance of 
Schelling’s model, empirics show neighborhoods are overall 
quite mixed”, inspired us to use the basic ideas of this 
model-type in order to create true individual agents 
consistently. The benefit of Schelling’s model approach, 
apart from it being the most influential approach in 
computational segregation research, is that it integrates a 
locational model and a “bounded-neighborhood model” [14]. 
From this starting point the results of the extended and 
modified simulation model presented here have demonstrated 
that segregation is a strong though small-scaled process when 
viewed from the bottom up. Even though: (1) agents 
individually vary in attitudes, decision-making, actions, and 
characteristics; (2) a universal threshold has been avoided; 
(3) macro social determinants have been included (with 
housing costs in at least an abstract manner), segregation 
took place.  
 Some empirical validation is given: while affluent 
households tend to exclude themselves from the rest of the 
society, poor households are mostly forced to segregate, 
although they would prefer to live in a socially mixed 
environment. Segregation is a controversial topic – in 
science, spatial planning, and politics. Among many others, 
one aspect has become increasingly crucial in debates on 
segregation: the knowledge transfer between people of 
different social statuses has been more and more interrupted, 
because of the creation of tangible and intangible borders. 
These borders tend to be used to make exclusion, injustice, 
and poverty invisible. A computational approach thus 
remains an important technique and provides a scientific 
contribution to detect the hidden mechanisms of these 
processes. 
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